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Abstract
Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as
a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided
an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary
stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been extensively studied in the literature. Sev-
eral articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. But no
general result has been established for the difficult case of simultaneous heterogenous mutations.
Authors propose specific selection dynamics to analyze this case. Vriend (2000) proposes using a
genetic algorithm for studying learning dynamics in this game and obtains convergence to Cournot
equilibrium with individual learning. The resulting convergence has been questioned by Arifovic and
Maschek (2006). The aim of this article is to clarify this controversy: it analyzes the mechanisms that
are behind these contradictory results and underlines the specific role of the spite effect. We show
why social learning gives rise to the Walrasian equilibrium and why, in a general setup, individual
learning can effectively yield convergence to the Cournot equilibrium. We also illustrate these general
results by systematic computational experiments.
JEL codes: L130; L200; D430; C630; C730.
Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilib-
rium; Genetic algorithms.
1 Introduction
The starting point of this article is the recent contradiction that has arisen in the literature about the
convergence to equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly games where boundedly rational agents’ learning is
represented using Genetic algorithms (GA). The interesting and contrasted results of Vriend (2000)
have been questioned by more recent studies, in particular, by Arifovic and Maschek (2006). The
main result of Vriend (2000) is convergence to Cournot equilibrium (CE) only when agents’ learning
is individual, while social learning yields convergence to the Walrasian equilibrium (WE). Arifovic
and Maschek (2006) confirm the result for social learning, but question the convergence results under
individual learning. The aim of this article is to clarify both the initial contrasted results, and the
contradiction between these two computational articles. This contradiction adds to a rather old
debate in economics.
Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is indeed a problem that recur-
rently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. Already in the 60’s, several articles in the
Review of Economic Studies discussed the convergence under best reply dynamics (see for example
Theocharis (1960)). This debate has led to the conclusion that best reply dynamics become unstable
under standard assumptions about demand and cost conditions as soon as there are three or more
firms in the oligopoly.
The development of evolutionary game theory (Maynard-Smith, 1982) has indirectly contributed
to this debate by providing an equilibrium concept more directly connected with other types of
adjustment dynamics (than best reply) which can arise when the learning of firms is taken into
account. Several articles have studied the evolutionary stability of equilibria in the Cournot game.
In a path-breaking article, Vega-Redondo (1997) shows that the Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is
the unique evolutionary stable outcome in a quantity competition game with a homogenous product
under certain specific assumptions about the interaction structure and strategy sets of the agents. The
results obtained in the articles that followed Vega-Redondo (1997) cast more doubt on the potential
convergence of adjustment dynamics to the Cournot equilibrium (CE). The nature of mutations
and the selection dynamics are at the core of these results. These dimensions directly result from
assumptions about the learning processes of boundedly rational firms with incomplete and imperfect
information.
The evolutionary stability concept is very useful for analyzing the convergence to equilibrium
with dynamics more naturally connected to social learning of firms through imitation of strategies
and experimentation (random mutations). But this stability concept does not exclude other learning
schemes, as long as they can be formulated as selection mechanisms operating at the level of firm
population. Unfortunately, richer learning schemes generally imply more complex dynamics, and
oligopoly is more naturally formulated as a playing the field game (each player playing against all
the others in each period), than a pairwise matching process. The analysis of these dynamics is very
difficult under general conditions and the existing literature proposes only partial results obtained
under specific assumptions, as in Vega-Redondo (1997). Stegeman and Rhode (2004) or Bergin and
Bernhardt (2004) consider relatively richer frameworks but they again obtain partial results that can-
not be used to draw general conclusions about the consequences of different representations of firms’
learning. This difficulty has motivated other recent studies to resort to agent based computational
models to explore the question of convergence (see for example Kirman (1995) for a simulation-based
analysis of three such specific learning rules).
Arifovic (1994) and Vriend (2000) develop models that adopt such an explorative strategy. They
use a computational representation of learning that is quite commonly retained in the literature:
genetic algorithms (see Dawid (1999), Valle´e and Yıldızog˘lu (2004)). GA represent the learning
of agents as an exploratory combination process based on random experiments and combination of
already discovered strategies. Arifovic (1994) initially obtained a convergence to the WE with this
type of learning mechanisms. Vriend (2000) advances that genetic algorithms (GA) can be used to
demonstrate the “essential difference between individual and social learning” of firms in a Cournot
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oligopoly: a GA operating at the firm population level yields convergence, under social learning,
to the WE, while a set of GAs each adjusting the strategies of an individual firm imply, under
individual learning, convergence to the CE. These results apparently contrast with Arifovic (1994).
They have also recently been questioned by Arifovic and Maschek (2006), who draw attention to the
specific implementation adopted by Vriend in terms of the mechanisms of GA-based learning and
the cost structure of firms. More precisely, Arifovic and Maschek confirm convergence to the WE
under social learning, but they cast some doubt on the possibility of convergence to the CE under
individual learning. Since all the results of these three articles are computational, it is difficult to
understand why the convergence results under social learning are so robust and why the results for
the individual learning are so controversial. It is important to verify if the difference between these
two types of learning is really essential. If this is the case, then we must try to understand the
fundamental mechanisms around which the debate about individual learning evolves.
The article is organized in two parts. The first part exposes the main results concerning imitation-
based social learning. These results will be established by studying the evolutionary stability of
equilibria in Cournot games (section 2), and by focusing on the main mechanism behind these results
(section 3 on spite effect). These analytical convergence results will cover all general cases but one:
the case with simultaneous and heterogenous mutations from equilibrium. Since this is the most
interesting case for the Cournot game, it will be necessary to follow the analysis by combining partial
analytical results with computational experiments. The second part (section 4) will consequently
analyze the convergence conditions when simultaneous heterogenous mutations are allowed. In order
to clarify the contradiction cited above, the analysis will be restricted to the special selection mech-
anism used by genetic algorithm based learning. When this is possible, we will rely on the general
results of the first part in this analysis (in particular for the social learning case). Our results should
also interest other domains where GA is used to represent individual or social learning (see for ex-
ample Valle´e and Basar (1999) or Yildizoglu (2002)). We will show why social learning cannot yield
convergence to CE, and why individual learning can converge to CE if the interactions of the firms
allow them to discover the decreasing relationship between the market price and their quantities.
The last section concludes the article.
2 Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in oligopoly
In this first section, we present the Cournot oligopoly game and its equilibria. We also define
evolutionary stability in this game. We also study the evolutionary stability of these equilibria,
before analyzing, in the section 3, the role of the spite effect.
2.1 A simple oligopoly model
We consider a standard symmetrical n−firms oligopoly model of quantity competition where all firms
produce a homogenous product. The inverse demand function for this good is given by p = p (Q) ,
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi and dp/dQ < 0. The common cost function of the firms is C (qi) , with C
′ > 0
and C ′′ > 0. The profit function of a firm is: pii(qi, . . . , qn) = p(Q)qi − C(qi). Since the interaction
between the strategies (quantities) of the firms only takes place through the common inverse demand
function (and hence, through the sum of these quantities), a quantity profile (q1, . . . , qn) can be
represented, from the point of view of a firm i, as (qi, Q−i) , where Q−i =
∑
j 6=i qj .
In this oligopoly, two different kinds of equilibrium can be defined: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(CE) and the Walrasian equilibrium (WE).
Definition 1. A Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CE) is given by a quantity profile qC and a market
price pC such as
1. Each firm maximizes its profit at this equilibrium
qCi = argmaxqipii
(
q i, Q
C
−i
)⇒ p (QC)+ qCi p′ (QC) = C ′ (qCi ) , ∀i = 1, . . . n (1)
2
2. The market clears: pC = p
(
QC
)
.
Definition 2. A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is given by a quantity profile qW and a market price
pW such as
1. Each firm uses marginal cost pricing (it is a price-taker)
qWi = argmaxqipii
(
q i; pW
)⇒ C ′ (qWi ) = pW , ∀i = 1, . . . n (2)
2. The market clears : pW = p
(
QW
)
.
Since dp/dQ < 0 and C
′′
> 0, the conditions (1) and (2) imply the standard results on the
comparison of this equilibrium:
qCi ≤ qWi ,∀i (3)
⇒ QC ≤ QW and pC ≥ pW (4)
piCi = pii
(
qCi , Q
C
−i
) ≥ pii (qWi , QW−i) = piWi ,∀i (5)
Consequently, the Cournot equilibrium is preferred by the firms, while the consumer’s surplus is
maximal in the Walrasian equilibrium. Hence, agents are not indifferent to the equilibrium to which
the market can converge. The analysis of the evolutionary stability of these equilibria sheds light
on this convergence, under the assumption that successful strategies will have a tendency to diffuse
through the population of firms.
2.2 Evolutionary stability of equilibrium
In standard evolutionary game theory, the selection dynamics are studied through symmetric pairwise
interactions within a large population of players. A strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
if, once adopted by the whole population, it cannot be invaded by a small mass of mutants (Maynard-
Smith (1982), Weibull (1995)). Or, following the traditional definition (Weibull 2006):
Definition 3. A strategy profile q∗ is said to be evolutionary stable (ESS) if, and only if, it meets
the following conditions:
pii(qi, Q∗−i) ≤ pii(q∗i , Q∗−i),∀qi,∀i (6)
pii(qi, Q∗−i) = pii(q
∗
i , Q
∗
−i)⇒ pii(qi, Q−i) < pii(q∗i , Q−i) (7)
It is clear that condition (6) implies that all ESS are Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies, but not
all NE strategies are necessarily ESS (because of the condition (7)).
When we consider random, pairwise contests between individuals drawn from a large population, we
arrive at this conclusion by assuming that both the predominant strategy and the mutant confront
the same population profile. As already noticed by Riley (1979), a strategy which satisfies conditions
(6− 7), may, nevertheless, not be protected against invasion by a mutant strategy if we have a finite
population game such as the Cournot game. In order to analyze an oligopoly situation we need,
as shown by Alo´s-Ferrer and Ania (2005), a definition of an ESS adapted to a finite population of
players that “play the field”, that is, all compete with each other simultaneously. Schaffer (1988)
arrives at the same conclusion and proposes a concept of a finite population ESS defined as follows.
Definition 4. In a finite population game, a strategy profile q∗ is said to be evolutionary stable if in
the presence of a mutant firm j playing qmj 6= q∗j
pii(q∗i , q
m
j , Q
∗
−i−j) ≥ pij(qmj , Q∗−j),∀i 6= j,∀qmj 6= q∗j (8)
where Q∗−i−j =
{
q∗1, . . . , q∗i−1, q
∗
i+1, . . . , q
∗
j−1, q
∗
j+1, . . . , q
∗
n
}
.
In our oligopoly game, this definition means that the profit of firm i must be higher if it faces a
mutant that plays qm than if it is that mutant.
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2.3 ESS and Nash equilibrium
As shown by Schaffer (1988), a finite population ESS is generally not a Nash equilibrium strategy,
since condition (8) does not exclude the possibility that
∃j, qmj , pij(qmj , Q∗−j) ≥ pij(q∗j , Q∗−j), (9)
Indeed, the consequence of condition (8) together with condition (9) is as follows: even if an individual
firm can obtain a net benefit by moving from the current equilibrium, the other firms will not imitate it
and the population will not be invaded by this mutant strategy. Consequently, the current equilibrium
strategy is ESS.
Proposition 1. (Schaffer (1989), Vega-Redondo (1997)) In a finite population oligopoly game, the
only ESS is the Walrasian equilibrium strategy.
Consequently, it is quite paradoxical to have an oligopoly where, when each individual firm tries
to adopt strategies with higher payoffs, the industry will, nevertheless, converge to WE where the
profit of the firms is lower than in the CE.
The next section will analyze the mechanisms behind this result. We will pay special attention
to the role of the spite effect in convergence to equilibrium.
3 Evolutionary stability of equilibrium and the spite effect
The mechanism that pushes the population towards the Walrasian equilibrium is well documented in
evolutionary literature, and its relation with the spite effect has been established by Schaffer (1989).
Hamilton (1970,1971) defines spiteful behavior as the capacity of an animal to harm both itself and
another, and gain an evolutionary advantage if the harm on the other animal is greater than the
self-harm. Schaffer establishes that the behavior of a firm that chooses to decrease its profit can
diffuse in the population if it can decrease the profits of its competitors by a greater extent, and
hence gain a comparative advantage.
Strictly speaking, the spite effect is the opposite of altruism. We should use the term ”spite
effect” only when the mutant firm j suffers from deviation (∆pij < 0), but suffers less than the
non-mutant firms (∆pii < ∆pij < 0,∀i 6= j). By analogy, in the positive direction, we may reinterpret
this effect as the fact that the net gain of the mutant (∆pij > 0) is greater than the net gain of the
non-mutant firms (∆pij > ∆pii) which is always true of course if the non-mutants suffer from the
deviations (∆pii < 0). Thus we have the following definition.
Definition 5. In a finite population oligopoly game, given that a firm j will deviate from an equilib-
rium strategy, a spite effect exists when ∆pii −∆pij < 0, i 6= j.
The relationship between Nash equilibrium (NE), ESS and spite effect is straightforward if we
consider strict Nash equilibrium. We can study the evolutionary stability of the NE under increasingly
complex assumptions. We first allow one single strategy to mutate. Then we analyze evolutionary
stability in the face of multiple identical mutations. Finally, we observe that obtaining a general result
with multiple heterogenous mutations is very difficult. This is why this configuration is studied in the
literature under more specific selection mechanisms, the second part of the article will consider such
a mechanism. The last part of section 3 will also establish the relationship between ESS, spite effect,
and maximization of relative payoffs, following Schaffer (1989), and Bergin & Bernhardt (2004).
3.1 Nash equilibrium and ESS in a finite population oligopoly game
We have already observed that any NE is not necessarily ESS. However we can show that in the
absence of the spite effect, a strict Nash equilibrium is ESS. Consequently, the role of the spite effect
is important.
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Definition 6. A strategy QN = (qN1 , q
N
2 , ..., q
N
n ) is a strict Nash equilibrium if
pii(qNi , Q
N
−i) > pii(qi, Q
N
−i),∀qi 6= qN (10)
Proposition 2. In a symmetric finite population oligopoly game, a strict Nash equilibrium strategy
profile is an ESS if a spite effect does not exist.
Proof.
Assume that we have a strict Nash equilibrium, qN :
pii(qNi , Q
N
−i) > pii(qi, Q
N
−i),∀qi 6= qN (11)
Recall that the spite effect does not hold if ∆pii −∆pij > 0, that is if:[
pii(qj , QN−j)− pii(qNj , QN−j)
]− [pij(qj , QN−j)− pi(qNj , QN−j)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by inequality (11)
> 0
which means that a sufficient condition is:
∆pii ≡ pii(qj , QN−j)− pii(qNj , QN−j) > 0,∀qj 6= qNj
It is easy to check that, since by symmetry pii(qNj , Q
N
−j) = pij(q
N
j , Q
N
−j), the last condition implies
that pii(qj , QN−j) > pij(q
N
j , Q
N
−j). And, by definition of the strict Nash equilibrium, we get the second
part of the following condition
pii(qj , QN−j) > pij(q
N
j , Q
N
−j) > pij(qj , Q
N
−j)
which thus establishes the ESS condition (8). So, if the spite effect does not occur, the symmetric
strict Nash equilibrium strategy is an ESS. 
This proposition establishes the role of the spite effect in the evolutionary stability of a strict NE.
We now establish more detailed results under increasingly complex assumptions about the allowed
mutations: single mutation, multiple identical mutations, and multiple heterogenous mutations.
3.1.1 One single mutation case
Proposition 3. In a finite population symmetric oligopoly game, with one possible single mutation,
a strategy profile qˆ = (qˆ1, ..., qˆn) is an ESS, and no spite effect occurs, if
dqi
(
p′dqi + p− C ′
)
< 0,∀i (12)
Proof.
With qˆ the profits of the firms are
pij(qˆ) = p(qˆ)qˆj − C(qˆj) (13)
pii(qˆ) = p(qˆ)qˆi − C(qˆi) (14)
A deviation of the firm j from the equilibrium, qj 6= qˆj , yields a new strategy profile qm =
{qˆ1, qˆ2, .., qˆj−1, qj , qˆj+1, ..., qˆn) and the following profits:
pij(qm) = p(qm)qj − C(qj) (15)
pii(qm) = p(qm)qˆi − C(qˆi),∀i (16)
The deviation will not be imitated if, with this new strategy profile qm, the mutant firm j earns a
lower profit than the non-mutant firms, that is if
pij(qm)− pii(qm) < 0
⇔ pij(qm)− pij(qˆ)− pii(qm) + pii(qˆ) < 0
⇔ ∆pii −∆pi−i < 0
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since, by the symmetry of the initial equilibrium, we have pii(qˆ) = pij(qˆ).
The net gain of firm j, ∆pij corresponds to (15)− (13):
∆pij = pij(qm)− pij(qˆ)
= [p(qm)qj − (p(qˆ)qˆj ]− [C(qj)− C(qˆj)]
For a local deviation, qj = qˆj + dqj we can compute the marginal net gain:
∆pij =
[
p(qˆj + dqj , Qˆ−j)(qˆj + dqj)− p(qˆ)qˆj
]
− [Cj(qˆj + dqj)− Cj(qˆj)] (17)
=
[
p(qˆj + dqj , Qˆ−j)− p(qˆ)
]
qˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
qˆjdp
+
[
p(qˆj + dqj , Qˆ−j)− p(qˆ, Qˆ−j) + p(qˆ)
]
dqj︸ ︷︷ ︸
dpdqj+pˆdqj
(18)
− [Cj(qˆj + dqj)− Cj(qˆj)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
dCj
(19)
with pˆ = p (qˆ) . For any other firm i 6= j we have:
∆pii = pii(qˆj + dqj , Qˆ−j)− pii(qˆ)
=
(
p(qˆj + dqj , Qˆ−j)− p(qˆ)
)
qˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
qˆidp
(20)
And consequently:
∆pij −∆pii < 0 (21)
⇒qˆjdp+ dpdqj + pˆdqj − dCj − qˆidp < 0
⇒dp(qˆj − qˆi) + dpdqj + pˆdqj − dCj < 0 (22)
⇒dpdqj + pˆdqj − dCj < 0 since qˆj = qˆi (23)
Since dp = p′dqj and dCj = C ′dqj ,
p′dqjdqj + pˆdqj − C ′dqj < 0 (24)
dqj
(
p′dqj + pˆ− C ′
)
< 0 (25)

Before discussing the implications of social learning with genetic algorithms in more detail in the
next section, we can already establish a first general result concerning social learning in the finite
oligopoly game.
Proposition 4. With imitation-based social learning, the strategies that imply a deviation from the
WE will be eliminated while the strategies that imply a deviation from the CE in the direction of the
WE will diffuse in the population.
Proof.
Local (infinitesimal) deviation from the WE. At the WE, we have pˆ = pw = C ′ and the condition for
stability (25) becomes p′(dqj)2 < 0. 
Proof. • dqj < 0: Since p′ < 0, the condition (25) holds. A single firm that deviates by decreasing
its quantity will benefit, via a price increase, from a revenue increase lower than that offered
to the firms who stay committed. So, the mutant strategy will not be replicated by imitation
and the Walrasian strategy will persist.
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Proof.
• dqj > 0: The firm that increases its quantity will decrease the market price to a level such that
the profit of every firm will decrease. However the loss of the mutant firm will be higher than
the loss of the firms continuing to play the Walrasian strategy. Again, this mutant strategy
will not be replicated in the population.
Local deviation from CE. Remark that at the CE we have, by definition, an equality between
marginal revenue and marginal cost. This means that p′jq
CE
j + p
CE − C ′ = 0. If the deviation is
local, we must have |dqj | < qCEj , then |p′dqj | < |p′qj | with p′ < 0. Therefore the following results
hold:
• dqj > 0 : Since pCE − C ′ > 0, p′jqCEj + pCE − C ′ = 0 and p′dqj < p′qCEj (since |dqj | < qCEj )
we necessarily have p′dqj + pCE −C ′ > 0. As a consequence, condition (12) does not hold, and
there is no spite effect. If one firm leaves the CE by increasing its quantity, it will decrease
its profits, but this decrease will be less than the reduction of the other firms’ profits. This
strategy will be replicated and the deviation from CE will diffuse in the population.
• dqj < 0: In this case, we have p′dqj > 0 > p′qCEj and dqj(p′dqj + pCE − C ′) < 0. Thus, no
one should imitate a strategy that moves away from the CE by decreasing the quantity again.
That is, if one firm decreases its quantity from CE, it will earn less supplementary profits than
the other firms. As a consequence, this strategy will not be replicated in the population.

This last proposition explains why imitation-based social learning drives the industry towards
WE. This result can be generalized to the case of multiple mutants, when the mutations are identical.
3.1.2 Generalization to m identical mutations
Assume that m firms play a strategy qj = q while the other n−m firms stay committed to the initial
equilibrium strategy q∗.
Definition 7. In a finite population game with m mutations, an equilibrium strategy (q∗1, q∗2, .., q∗n),
with q∗i = q
∗,∀i, is a strong ESS if, ∀qj 6= q∗,
piim(qj , Q−jm) > pijm(qj , Qjm)
with Qjm ≡ (m− 1)qj + (n−m)q∗, jm any mutant firm and im any non-mutant firm.
This means that if m firms play qj 6= q∗, the profits of these m firms should be lower than the
profits of the n−m firms that stay committed to q∗. From this remark, Schaffer (1988) defines the
concept of m− stable (finite population) ESS as follows.
Definition 8. An equilibrium strategy (q∗1, q∗2, .., q∗n) is called an m-stable (finite population) ESS if
pii(Qmˆ) > pij(Qmˆ) and pii(Qm+1) < pij(Qm+1)
with 1 ≤ mˆ ≤ m, and with Qmˆ ≡ mˆqj + (n− mˆ)q∗ and Qm+1 ≡ (m+ 1)qi + (n− (m+ 1))q∗.
The m-stable ESS means that as long as the number of the mutants is less than or equal to m
the initial equilibrium strategy is an ESS one.
Proposition 5. In a finite population oligopoly game, a strategy profile q∗ = (q∗1, q∗2, ..., q∗n) is an ESS
equilibrium whatever the number of mutants, if at least one non-mutant firm does not suffer from the
spite effect implied by deviations from q∗.
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Proof.
Note by Im the set of mutant firms. With qj = qˆ,∀j ∈ Im, qi = q∗i = q∗,∀i /∈ Im and Qm =
mqˆ + (n−m)q∗, the profits of the firms become
For any mutant firm: pij(Qm) = p(Qm)qˆ − Ci(qˆ) (26)
For any non-mutant firm: pii(Qm) = p(Qm)q∗ − C(q∗) (27)
It is clear that the net gains ∆pij are equivalent between all mutant firms and, ∆pii, between all
non-mutant firms. If the spite effect does not work on at least one non-mutant firm, then it does
not work on any non-mutant firm and these firms do not have any incentive to imitate the mutant
strategy. As a consequence, the initial strategy profile is an ESS. 
Corollary 1. The Walrasian equilibrium strategy is an m-stable ESS, ∀m < n− 1.
Proof.
Since the firms are identical, the oligopoly game with n firms and with m mutants is equivalent to a
2-player game with one single mutant. Thus, if the Walrasian equilibrium is an ESS with one single
mutant for any finite population size n, it is an m stable ESS with m identical mutants. 
3.1.3 The case of m heterogenous mutations
Let us assume that there exists m heterogenous mutants. In our oligopoly game, this means that
some firms will increase their quantities while others will decrease their’s. In such a framework, the
firms that do not move will have an evolutionary stable strategy if they can at least get profits as
high as the best of the mutants. In that case, the following definition holds.
Definition 9. An equilibrium strategy (q∗1, q∗2, .., q∗n) is an ESS with m heterogenous mutants com-
posing the set Im under the following condition: if, for ∀qj 6= q∗, j ∈ Im, ∀qi = q∗, i /∈ Im, and with
qˆ, a strategy profile composed of m mutant strategies qj and n−m equilibrium strategies q∗, we have
pii(qˆ) > max
j∈Im
pij(qˆ),∀i.
This definition means that whatever quantities the mutants choose, and whatever the new total
quantity, the non-mutant firms must obtain a higher profit than any mutant firm. Otherwise, at
least one mutation will be optimal to imitate, and it will diffuse.
As observed by Schaffer (1989), a strategy profile may be m-stable with homogenous mutants (e.g.
mutations in the same direction) but unstable with heterogenous mutations.
It is very difficult to obtain general results with multiple heterogenous mutations since we can
have mutations in opposite directions with an ambiguous and variable aggregate effect. Vega-
Redondo (1997) and Bergin & Bernhardt (2004) limit this problem by adopting an approach that
restricts the quantities to a discrete grid in order to structure possible deviations. Both obtain con-
vergence to WE under imitation-based learning. In Bergin and Bernhardt (2004), convergence to
CE only happens under specific cases of individual learning with memory. Unfortunately, given the
specific constraints of these articles, they cannot provide a definitive conclusion to the controversy
studied by our article, even if their results can guide us in our explorations (see the next section).
Following Schaffer (1989) and Bergin & Bernhardt (2004), we can reformulate the relation between
spite effect and the ESS on the basis of relative payoffs of firms. This will also allow us to introduce
the fitness concept that is central to the evolutionary learning mechanisms.
3.2 ESS and the importance of the relative payoffs
As observed by Schaffer (1989), there is a relationship between the finite population ESS concept
and the “beat the average” game. Obviously, a strategy is an ESS if it is not possible to increase the
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relative payoff by individual mutation, which means that it is a Nash equilibrium in the “beat the
average” game reformulation of the initial oligopoly game.
Let us define the relative payoff function of a firm i by the difference of the firm’s profit and the
population’s average profit:
piRi (qi, Q−i) ≡ pii(qi, Q−i)−
1
n
n∑
j=1
pij(qj , Q−j)
In an initial symmetrical configuration1 (pij = pi,∀j), we must have piRi (qi, Q−i) =
(n− 1)
n
pii(qi, Q−i)−
pi−i, with pi−i =
(n− 1)
n
pi, with pij(qj , Q−j) = pi ∀j 6= i.
Proposition 6. If q∗ is not ESS, then there exists at least one mutant strategy qˆj such that the
relative profit of the mutant firm j increases.
Proof.
We know that q∗ is not an (symmetrical) ESS if
pij(qˆj , Q∗−j)− pii(qˆj , Q∗−j) > 0
Since the non-mutant firms are symmetric, we can pose pi = pii(qˆj , Q∗−j), i 6= j. Then we have from
(8)
n− 1
n
(
pij(qˆj , Q∗−j)− pii(qˆj , Q∗−j)
)
> 0
pij(qˆj , Q∗−j)
(n− 1)
n
− (n− 1)
n
pi > 0
(n− 1)
n
pij(qˆj , Q∗−j)− pi−j = piRj (qˆj , Q∗−j) > 0
That is, the relative profit of the mutant is positive. Since we start from an initial symmetrical
equilibrium where piR(q∗j , Q
∗
−j) = 0, the relative profit of the mutant firm does indeed increase. 
Another implication of this proposition can be formulated using the relative fitness (fi) concept
that we will use later in this article (see Definition 10, page 11):
fi =
pii(qi, Q−i)∑n
j=1(pij(qj , Q−j))
=
pii(qi, Q−i)
pii(qi, Q−i) + Π−i
.
where Π−i =
∑
k 6=i pij(qi, Q−i). The fitness measure is used in most biological games (and in nearly
all evolutionary simulations) as the base for the selection process in a given population.
Corollary 2. If q∗ is not an ESS, there exists at least one strategy qˆj such that the fitness of the
firm is increased.
Proof.
First note that Π−i = (n− 1)pi−i = (n− 1)pi. From the previous proof we know that
pij(qˆj , Q−j)
(n− 1)
n
− (n− 1)
n
pi > 0
pij(qˆj , Q−j)(n− 1)− (n− 1)pi > 0
npij(qˆj , Q−j) > pij(qˆj , Q−j) + Π−i
pij(qˆj , Q−j)
pij(qˆj , Q−j) + Π−i
>
1
n
1For a non-homogenous initial situation, the proposition can be trivially proved by considering a deviation consisting
in the imitation of the best strategy.
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Since initially the fitness is
fi =
pii
pii +Π−i
=
pi
npi
=
1
n
then the fitness of the mutant firm increases. 
The study of general learning process of firms in a Cournot oligopoly implies the consideration
of simultaneous heterogenous mutations and suffers from the difficulty we highlighted at the end of
the preceding section. As a consequence, the literature has adopted an experimental strategy to
tackle this problem: several articles introduce specific learning processes in order analyze, in more
detail, the convergence of learning dynamics to equilibria, under heterogenous mutations. However,
it appears that different learning processes can yield contrasting convergence results under genetic
algorithm-based selection dynamics, as shown by the debate that followed the interesting, contested
results obtained by Vriend (2000). These selection dynamics are driven by the relative fitness of
firms’ different strategies, as in Definition 10. As a consequence, this debate is around a particular
case of the general framework studied in the preceding section, as shown in Corollary 2. We will be
able to clarify, in the next section, the mechanisms that are behind the convergence results obtained
with GA-based learning processes considered by the literature. We will observe that Corollary 2 will
directly imply our main result concerning the social learning case. This analysis will also give us the
opportunity to introduce individual learning, which should be contrasted with the imitation-based
social learning. The consideration of this type of learning will directly be subject to the difficulty
outlined in Definition 9. A specific theoretical analysis and computational experiments will help us
to obtain partial results in this difficult case.
4 Learning, selection, and convergence to equilibrium
We now consider the possibility for firms to adapt their production levels as a consequence of their
learning. Arifovic (1994) has introduced genetic algorithm (GA) as a tool for modeling adaptive
learning of firms in a Cournot oligopoly. The main result of this article is the convergence to the
WE under social and individual learning. More recently, Vriend (2000) questioned these results by
showing that convergence to CE can be observed under individual learning. Arifovic and Maschek
(2006) has cast some doubt on this result by showing the difficulty of converging to CE even with
individual learning, except under the very specific assumptions adopted by Vriend (2000). Based on
the general results established in the preceding section, we will analyze some general mechanisms that
encompass all these contradictory results, and explain why they are obtained under the corresponding
assumptions. After having discussed the selection mechanism implied by the GA, we will first analyze
the convergence to equilibrium under social learning. The results of this first step are directly
derived from the first part of our article; we just transpose them to the specific selection mechanism
corresponding to GA. Then we will study individual learning and show why the expectations-based
learning assumed by Arifovic (1994) and by Arifovic and Maschek (2006) cannot converge to CE,
and why repetition-based learning of Vriend (2000) can. We will generalize the specific results of
these articles under more standard assumptions for the Cournot oligopoly game.
4.1 Modeling learning with genetic algorithms (GA)
A GA is based on mechanisms inspired by biological evolution: selection, crossover, and mutation.
The canonical genetic algorithm makes a population of chromosomes, {Aj} , j = 1...m evolve. The
size of the population (m) is given and is the source of one of the strengths of GA: implicit parallelism
(the exploration of the solution space using several candidates in parallel). The population of chro-
mosomes at step t (a generation) is denoted P (t) = {Aj}t with #P (t) = m, and ∀t = 1, 2...T with
T , the given number of generations. Notice that the size of T is the other source of the strengths of
the GA. The algorithm (randomly) generates an initial population P (0) of candidate chromosomes
that are evaluated at each period using the fitness (value) function. These chromosomes are used for
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composing a new population at the next period P (t+1). Each chromosome has a probability of being
selected that increases with its relative fitness. The members included in the new population are
recombined using a crossovermechanism. The crossover operation introduces controlled innovations
in the population, combining the candidates already selected in order to create new candidates with
a potentially better fitness. In addition, the mutation operator randomly modifies the candidates
and introduces some random experimenting in order to explore more extensively the state space and
escape local optima. Typically, the probability of mutation is relatively low in comparison with the
probability of crossover because otherwise the disruption introduced by excessive mutations could
destroy the hill-climbing capacity of the population. Finally, an elitism operator can be used to
ensure that the best chromosome of a population will be carried to the next generation.
In the context of oligopoly, the GA is used to represent the learning capacity of the firms: it can
make a population of production levels evolve based on increasing fitness, the profits resulting from
these quantities. Vriend (2000) contrasts two different implementations of this approach and claims
that this comparison can prove an essential difference between social and individual learning. In the
case of social learning, the population of strategies that evolve through GA contains one strategy per
firm and the operations of the GA correspond to imitation between firms (crossover operator) and
to random experimenting by some firms (mutation operator). In the case of individual learning, the
GA operates on the individual strategy population of each firm (we have as many GAs as firms in
the economy) and the operations of the GA correspond to recombination of strategies already found
(crossover operator) and to random experimenting in the strategy population of the firm (mutation
operator).
By confronting these two different learning approaches, Vriend (2000) obtains a convergence
to WE under social learning and convergence to CE, under individual learning. Arifovic and
Maschek (2006) question these results by stressing the difficulty of converging to CE. Our preceding
discussion would indicate that the results of Vriend (2000) are robust, even if they are obtained in
this article under very specific demand and cost conditions, and with a very specific application of
the GA methodology. We will now explore the general mechanisms behind these different results in
the literature. Our analysis will be focused on the main operator in the evolution of the population:
fitness-based selection. We will show that convergence occurs even though we ignore crossover and
elitism operators in our analysis. This focalization will have the advantage of allowing us to con-
nect the results on learning with the general results we obtained in the preceding section. In our
computational experiments, we use a uniform rate of exactly one mutation in each run of the GA.
Appendix A.2 specifies the structure of the GA used in our experiments.
In any population of strategies, the convergence to WE will occur in general if the selection
mechanism favors strategies with higher quantities when the market outcome is below the WE and
the strategies with lower quantities when the market is above the WE. Since the selection is based
on a relative fitness of a strategy (whatever the particular definition of this fitness), this condition
is equivalent to a necessarily increasing relationship between quantities and the relative fitness of
strategies below the WE, and a decreasing relationship above the WE.
Definition 10. If we denote the fitness of a strategy in the population of strategies by Fj, its relative
fitness will be given by
fj =
Fj∑
j Fj
(28)
In the context of the oligopoly, we will, in general, have a fitness function that will be positively
related to the profit of the firm: fj = f
(
pij
+
)
. If the share of a strategy j in the population is
noted by λj , the population of strategies will only be invaded by Walrasian strategies if we have the
following correlation
corr(λj , qj)

> 0 if qj ≤ qW
< 0 if qj > qW
0 if qj = qW
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In the case of the standard genetic algorithm, the selection operates through a roulette wheel process
where the probability of reproduction of a strategy in the population is given by its relative fitness.
In the case of the oligopoly, this fitness is directly related to the profits2 of the firms and we will show
that the way these profits are compared during reproduction and selection is the essential difference
between social and individual learning. We first analyze the convergence to equilibrium under social
learning.
4.2 Social learning
In the case of social learning, each strategy is played by a specific firm and the probability of the
survival of a strategy results from the comparison of the profit of the firm i that uses this strategy
(qi) with the profits of other firms
fi =
pii(qi, Q−i)∑n
i=1 pii(qi, Q−i)
If we denote Π−i ≡
∑
k 6=i pik(qi, Q−i), we can note this relative fitness as
fi =
pii(qi, Q−i)
Π−i + pii(qi, Q−i)
Proposition 7. The relative fitness function of the GA for social learning will be favorable to higher
quantities which will push the population towards the WE iff
⇔ εpii,qi > εΠ−i,qi
where εy,x represents the elasticity of y with x.
Proof.
The relative fitness depends on the quantity corresponding to the strategy of the firm i in the following
way
∂fi
∂qi
=
∂pii
∂qi
(Π−i + pii)− pii(∂Π−i
∂qi
+
∂pii
∂qi
)
(Π−i + pii(qi, q−i))2
∂fi
∂qi
=
∂pii
∂qi
Π−i − pii∂Π−i
∂qi
(Π−i + pii)2
(29)
Hence, we observe that
sgn
(
∂fi
∂qi
)
= sgn
(
∂pii
∂qi
Π−i − pii∂Π−i
∂qi
)
. (30)
This relative fitness will consequently be favorable to higher quantities in a way to push the population
towards the WE iff
sgn
(
∂fi
∂qi
)
> 0
∂pii
∂qi
Π−i > pii
∂Π−i
∂qi
(31)
⇔ qi
pii
∂pii
∂qi
>
qi
Π−i
∂Π−i
∂qi
⇔ εpii,qi > εΠ−i,qi (32)
2We will directly use the profits as fitness in the following.
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
Consequently, the tendency towards the WE equilibrium will depend, in this case, on the compar-
ison of the impact of the quantity increase on a firm’s profit with the same impact on the total profits
of its competitors. If this impact is positive, the increase of the quantity of the firm i will increase
the survival probability of this strategy if, and only if, the impact on its own profit is greater than
the impact on the other firms’ total profit. If this impact is negative, this is directly related to the
spite effect : a firm that will move from a CE quantity may decrease its profit (ε(Πi,qi) < 0), but it will
decrease the competitors’ profits even more (0 > ε(Πi,qi) > ε(Π−i,qi)) and it will, therefore, increase its
relative fitness. We must distinguish two cases in the evaluation of these impacts: infinite population
and finite population market games. The latter is, of course, much more relevant to analyzing an
oligopoly.
4.2.1 Infinite population of firms
When the population of firms is large, the influence of each firm is negligible, and the quantity
variation of one particular firm i does not significantly modify the market price or the profits of
the competitors: ∂p(qi, Q−i)/∂qi = 0 and ∂Π−i/∂qi = 0. This of course considerably simplifies the
evaluation of the terms of the equation (32):
εpii,qi > εΠ−i,qi = 0
and
εpii,qi =
qi
pii
[
p(qi, Q−i)− ∂p(qi, Q−i)
∂qi
qi − dC
dqi
]
=
qi
pii
(
p− C ′)
which implies, for pii > 0, qi > 0
εpii,qi

> 0 if qi ≤ qW
< 0 if qi > qW
= 0 if qi = qW
since qW is the Walrasian strategy and it verifies, by definition, pW −C ′ (qW ) = 0. Hence, we observe
that increasing quantities will diffuse in the population when the actual outcome is below the WE,
and their fitness will play against their reproduction when the industry is above this equilibrium.
This is the main mechanism that pushes the industry towards the WE instead of the CE when the
population of firms is very large.
4.2.2 Finite population of firms
In a finite population, the atomistic property is no longer verified. Consequently, it becomes possible
to have ∂p(qi, Q−i)/∂qi < 0 and ∂Π−i/∂qi 6= 0. If we consider the latter derivative
∂Π−i
∂qi
=
∂(
∑
j 6=i(pqj − C(qj))
∂qi
=
∑
j 6=i
(
∂p
∂qi
qj) =
∂p
∂qi
∑
j 6=i
qj =
∂p
∂qi
Q−i
= p
′
Q−i (33)
since dCj/dqi = 0 and ∂p/∂qi = ∂p/∂Q× ∂Q/∂qi = ∂p/∂Q = p′ . We can also easily observe that
∂pii
∂qi
= p
′
qi + p− C ′
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Consequently, the equation (30) becomes
sgn
(
∂fi
∂qi
)
= sgn
(
(p
′
qi + p− C ′)Π−i − p′Q−ipii
)
(34)
= sgn
(
(p− C ′)Π−i + p′(qiΠ−i −Q−ipii)
)
(35)
The first term shows that the impact of an increase of qi depends on the position of the firm i in
terms of marginal cost and price (similar to the infinite population case). However it also depends on
the relative quantities and profits of the firms, in a more complicated way than can be easily linked
to the spite effect. We can note that the second term in equation (35) can be reformulated as the
following:
qiΠ−i −Q−ipii = qiΠ−i + qipii − qipii −Q−ipii
= qiΠ−QΠi
⇒ sgn
(
p
′
(qiΠ−i −Q−ipii)
)
= −sgn
(
qi
Q
− pii
Π
)
since p′ < 0. When Π > 0, this effect will favor increasing quantities if the market share of the firm
is lower than its profit share. Consequently, if we have Π−i > 0 and Π > 0,
∂fi
∂qi

> 0 iff pii > 0, qi < qW ,
qi
Q
<
pii
Π
≤ 0 iff pii < 0, qC < qi < qW
= 0 iff qi = qW
since p
′
qi + p − C ′ < 0 in equation (34) if qC < qi, and p = C ′, qi/Q = pii/Π if qi = qW ,∀i. Hence,
the strategies will move the quantities towards the WE if the firms can obtain positive profits in the
neighborhood of WE. This result complies with Corollary 2.
Hence, we conclude that social learning will drive the market towards the WE if these basic
conditions (such as the feasibility of WE), easily compatible with a standard Cournot oligopoly
model, are verified. We now turn our attention to the more controversial case of GA-based individual
learning.
4.3 Individual learning
When the learning of the firms is individual, the firms cannot count on directly learning strategies
from competitors (imitation) through their interactions in the market. Each firm must extract
the necessary information on the relevance of its current strategy from the global market variables
observable by that firm, resulting from the interactions of the firms (mainly, the market price), and
from the profit it obtains with its strategy under these market conditions.
Consequently, when the firm cannot observe the actions and the profits of other firms, learning
dynamics are not based on imitation and the spite effect cannot directly play a part. The main
question again is the consequence of these dynamics in terms of convergence to equilibrium. Since
convergence to the WE with social learning is general, the capability of such a learning to allow
the emergence of a CE becomes the main controversial point in this approach. This capability will
strongly depend on the kind of information which the firm can obtain during its learning process.
Riechmann (2006b) says that ”if agents do not know or simply neglect the state dependent
nature of the problem, i.e. the fact that they do have an influence on the market price, the outcome
of individual learning will be the Walras equilibrium. The reason for this is straightforward: if agents
do not think or do not know they can influence the market price, the best thing they can do is to
compute a best response to last period’s equilibrium price”. We will show that this intuition is
relevant for understanding the conditions of convergence to the CE.
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In this context, the learning of agents is based on the comparison of performances of different
strategies inside each firm, while competition will imply an interaction at the market level between
the selected strategies in each period. Consequently, the concepts of convergence and stability become
more intricate. A quantity profile q∗ will be stable at the market level if, and only if, every firm
plays (selects) the corresponding equilibrium strategy, and every firm will play this strategy only if
the learning process of the firm has effectively converged to it.
The coevolution of strategy populations of firms and convergence of the GA towards equilibrium,
will strongly depend on the approaches used by the models for the selection process and the evaluation
of the fitness. Vriend (2000), Arifovic and Maschek (2006), and other articles, discuss the convergence
problem with a representation of strategy evolution based on different formulations for the genetic
algorithm. Two contrasted approaches have been used in this formulation: learning with profit
expectations based on the actual market price used for evaluating (through hypothetical profits) the
population of strategies in each period (approach used by Arifovic (1994) and partly by Arifovic and
Maschek (2006)), and learning without expectations, evaluating one strategy in each period. Other
intermediate cases have also been considered, as in Vriend (2000) where the GA does not intervene
in each period.
We now contrast the convergence properties of these two different learning schemes: with and
without expectations.
4.3.1 Individual learning with expectation-based on hypothetical profits
In this case, the firms use expectations based on the last period price for evaluating the fitness of
each strategy in their population. This hypothetical profit determines the relative fitness of each
strategy and guides the selection process. The main algorithm of this game can be summarized as a
simple pseudo-code if the oligopoly game has a duration of T periods (see Figure 1).
• Period 0: a population of k strategies, qij ∈ q0i , is drawn for each player i.
• Period 1: each player plays (random choice) a particular strategy qij ∈ q0i .
The corresponding market price, p1, is calculated.
• While Period ≤ T :
– The hypothetical profit of each strategy qij ∈ qt−1i is calculated with
this price:
piij(qij , p1) = pt−1qij − C (qij) , for all i.
– Using GA procedures (selection, crossover, and mutation) in each strat-
egy population, a new population of strategies qti is defined for each firm
based on these profits.
– Again the hypothetical profits are calculated
{pii1(qi1, pt−1), ..., piik(qik, pt−1)}.
– From this set, one (possibly the best) strategy is drawn in order to be
played: qtij
– The new market price: pt is calculated.
Figure 1: Pseudocode of the learning model with hypothetical profits
It is important to note that in each period t, each strategy is evaluated using the same given price
pt−1. Thus, with the roulette wheel selection, the relative fitness of a given strategy j of the player
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i would correspond to:
fij =
pii(qij , pt−1)∑k
j=1 pii(qij , pt−1)
=
pii(qij , pt−1)
pii(qij , pt−1) +
∑k
l=1,l 6=j pii(qi,l, pt−1)
=
pii(qij , pt−1)
pii(qij , pt−1) + Πi,−j
where Πi,−j =
∑k
l=1,l 6=j pii(qi,l, p
t−1).
Since now qij cannot modify the given price pt−1, the total impact of qij on fij is given by
∂fij
∂qij
=
(
∂pii(qij , pt−1)
∂qij
)Πi − ∂pii(qij , p
t−1)
∂qij
pii(qij , pt−1)
Π2i
=
(
∂pii(qij , pt−1)
∂qij
)Πi,−j
Π2i
=
(pt−1 − C ′)Πi,−j
Π2i

> 0 if C ′ < pt−1
< if C ′ > pt−1
= 0 if C ′ = pt−1
with Πi =
∑k
l=1 pii(qi,l, p
t−1) and if Πi,−j > 0.
Consequently, the best relative fitness will be attained under the same conditions as the Walrasian
pricing rule
(
C
′
= p
)
since:
• during the roulette wheel procedure of the GA, given a price p:
– higher quantities will spread in the population, as long as p > C
′ ⇔ qj < qW
– lower quantities will diffuse if p < C
′ ⇔ qj > qW
• the strategy that will be played will be the closest one to the competitive quantity if the selection
of the strategy to play is based on maximal possible fitness: qj such that j ∈ maxqil fil,∀l
We have already shown above that there is a strong relationship between the evolution of fitness
and ESS.
Proposition 8. Under hypothetical individual learning, the CE is not evolutionarily stable, while the
WE is.
Proof.
Assume that all players except i are already at the CE solution and that they will stick to it,
QC−i = {qC1 , ..qCi−1, qCi+1, ..qCn }. In this case, the learning of player i is identical to the learning of a
monopoly that ignores the exact price relationship p(qi, QC−i). The hypothetical learning procedure
leads to an evaluation of the profit at period t that is based on the previous price pt−1: pii,t(qij , pt−1) =
pt−1qij −C(qij). It is evident that the fitness evolution, as a maximization of the hypothetical profit,
will lead to the Walrasian condition: C
′
= pt−1. Consequently, the CE equilibrium is not ESS, while
the WE is. 
We use computational experiments to illustrate our results for this section and for the following
section. The details of the simulation protocol are given in Appendix A. Figure 2 represents the
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Figure 2: Convergence to WE price with hypothetical learning
evolution of market price under expectations-based individual learning. It clearly shows that the
market price quickly converges to WE price in all simulations. In accordance with the theoretical
results, this kind of learning cannot yield convergence to CE. Consequently, the numerical results
obtained by Arifovic (1994) and by Arifovic and Maschek (2006) for this type of learning are perfectly
normal.
We will now consider a type of learning that is based on the direct use of strategies, as in
Vriend (2000) (or in Yildizoglu (2003) under different circumstances).
4.3.2 Individual learning without expectations
In this approach, the firm does not use the previous period’s price, and it must experiment with
strategies in order to evaluate their relative fitness. Such a learning process precludes any capacity
of firms to generalize from their experience, in order to form expectations. The cognitive capacity of
the firm and its forward looking ability are quite limited in this case. In such a framework, the only
source of learning for the firm is the effective utilization of each strategy in its population.
If the environment of the firm (the structure of the market and the strategies used by the other
firms) is completely stable, using once each strategy in the population would be sufficient to discover
the relative fitness of this strategy. In a multi-player game, such as the Cournot oligopoly, the
environment will not be stable as long as other firms continue to learn and change their quantities as
a consequence of this learning. In such dynamic setups, each strategy must be used for a sufficiently
long time, in order for the firm to discover its fitness against the strategies of other firms. This
is the experimentation period or, as it is called in training based learning mechanisms, an epoch.
Vriend (2000) introduces into the GA such a training period, named the GArate, of length 100 (the
GA modifies the population of strategies once every GARate period). We will show below why this
is an important condition in the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium. We will then establish,
using computational experiments, the length of the epoch, in our special setup, that would assure
the convergence to equilibrium under different selection mechanisms. We will show that the rather
special learning setup used in Vriend (2000) is necessary in order to obtain the convergence to the
CE with individual learning, and that the experimentation period is a very important dimension of
17
the convergence results when agents’ learning is not forward looking.
In this new experimental setup, each population of strategies is played without modification during
τ periods (an epoch). A special case would be an epoch of k periods (k = number of chromosomes)
where each strategy is played only once, following a sequential order, but one can consider more
sophisticated configurations. During an epoch, strategies from given populations meet each other
following the actual strategy-selection scheme used by the firms (random, roulette wheel, play the
best, etc.). Profits attributed to different strategies are updated following this matching process and,
at the end of the epoch, the GA modifies populations based on these profits. Figure 3 gives the
pseudo-code of this configuration. Profits are randomly initialized and they are only updated when
they are used in the market or when the corresponding quantities are changed by a mutation.
• Period 0: a set of k strategies, qij ∈ q0i , is (randomly) drawn for each player
i.
• While Period ≤ T :
– if (Period (mod τ) = 0): using GA procedures, as the roulette wheel
selection, a new set of strategies, qφi , is defined for each firm. Profits
of new strategies resulting from mutations are randomly drawn around
the average profit of the firm’s strategy population. Other strategies
carry on their fitness from epoch to epoch.
– each player plays a strategy qij ∈ qφi . The corresponding market price,
pt, is calculated. The realized profit is calculated (pii,t(Qt, pt)).
Figure 3: Pseudocode of learning model without expectations
Consequently, this learning model differs from the hypothetical profit case in one important
aspect. Each strategy is evaluated using the effectively observed profit that it yields by repeatedly
meeting the strategies of other firms. This observed profit necessarily results from the market price
corresponding to these strategies, and it can now include some information on the demand curve if
the same population of quantities can meet different, but given, quantities of the competitors. This
obviously will only be possible if τ is long enough in comparison with the strategy population size.
Given a τ, the strategies of the firm i will meet τ times the strategy populations of other firms
{qlj}l=1...n,l 6=g. At the end of an epoch, and before the intervention of the GA, the average profit of
an individual strategy qij will be given by
E [pii (qij , Q−i)] = E [p (qij , Q−i)] qij − C (qij) = pqij − C (qij) (36)
with
p =
∑
l 6=i
p
(
qij ,
∑
l
qlj
)
· f (qlj |τ)
where f (qlj |τ) is the frequency for qij of meeting each individual strategy of the other firms, condi-
tioned by the strategy selection process (the selection of the strategies to be played on the market),
and the length of the epoch during which the strategy populations remain constant: τ . When τ is
very short in comparison with the strategy population size (k), then qij will only be able to meet a
very limited subset of strategy profiles of other firms and i will have only partial information about
the price mechanism. On the contrary, if τ is long enough, qij is able to meet all strategies of other
firms and the firm i will have a precise idea about the price it can expect with different quantities in
its population and the corresponding expected profits. We indeed observe that
lim
τ→∞f (qlj |τ) = f (qlj)
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which is the real empirical frequency of each strategy in the strategy population of the firm l. The
average profit of equation (36) will correspond in this case to the expected profit with the strategy
qij ,∀j = 1..k. Consequently, given the populations of other firms, the average profit of qij that results
from the matching process will imply in this case ∂p/∂qij < 0, and the selection process will be able
to use this information about the demand curve. The strategies that correspond to C ′ = p will then
be dominated by strategies that are closer to the condition C ′ = p+ qij∂p/∂qij < p. This mechanism
will push the strategies towards the CE instead of the WE.
Again we use computational experiments to illustrate these mechanisms. From the preceding
discussion, the results on convergence will establish the role of two main dimensions of the learning
process: the length of the epoch, τ and the mechanism that is used to select, in the strategy population
of each firm, the quantity that is played on the market (see Appendix A.2). We study in three steps
the convergence to equilibria in this setup.
First, we give some illustrative results in Figure 4: the results of simulations (a batch of 20
simulations with each configuration) for the baseline configuration of the oligopoly (see Appendix A.1)
and the roulette wheel selection. In each configuration we run the GA exactly 300 generations (the
duration of the simulations is hence equal to T = 300τ). These first results clearly show that the
convergence of the market price to the CE price is favored by longer τ : none of the 20 runs converge
for τ = 1, and only a weak convergence is observable for τ = 10. Longer epochs are necessary for a
clear convergence (especially, when τ = 100—the case of Vriend (2000)—the convergence is observed
in all 20 runs).
The results of Figure 4 are aggregate and they do not indicate the dispersion that could hide
behind these results: are the quantities of different firms close to the CE? For a more rigorous proof
of convergence, we give, in the second step, more systematic results summarized in Table 1. To
obtain these results, we simulate 20 runs with a GA of 200 generations in each run. We study the
convergence of the best quantity in the strategy population of firms (the strategy with the highest
relative fitness in the strategy population of each firm) to the Cournot equilibrium. We check this
convergence by testing the null hypothesis that the observed average of these quantities in the last
period of each run is equal to the CE quantity
(
H0 : q = qC
)
. We use Student’s t-tests for checking
if we can reject this null hypothesis. If for a run we can not reject the hypothesis, we consider that
convergence has occurred for this run. We also give the p− values corresponding to the probability
of accepting by error this null hypothesis. In order to show the importance of the strategy selection
mechanisms, we compare the results obtained using three different methods: Random Selection (RS),
Roulette Wheel Selection (RWS) and Play the Best (PTB) (see Appendix A.2 for more details).
The first two lines of each part of the table show that if the strategies do not meet frequently
enough (τ ≤ 10), the information on demand is quite difficult to extract and firms have some difficulty
in converging to CE, no matter what the selection mechanism used for choosing the played quantities.
This effect is stronger for the random selection (RS) mechanism since the matching of the strategies
is not oriented at all in this case. We observe that other mechanisms already fare quite well, even
for τ = 10.
Matching mechanisms integrating some intrinsic randomness (in complement to the randomness
implied by the mutations) give rise to convergence to the CE price when τ is higher. The PTB
mechanism that systematically plays for each firm its supposedly best strategy of the period, has
some difficulty in converging: it has a tendency to over-shoot by over estimating the strength of
dp/dqij and hence by over reducing the production of firms. The convergence is not systematic with
this mechanism, even for quite long epochs (τ = 50; 75). RWS assures systematic convergence as
soon as τ ≥ 25. We observe in the last column of the table that the likelihood of the convergence to
the CE clearly increases with τ and highest values are observed for the RWS mechanism.
In the last step, we consider the dispersion of quantities in the strategy populations of the firms
(and not only for the best strategy in each population). Figure 5 exhibits the distribution of
quantities observed in the last epochs of 20 simulations using the RWS and τ = 100. Figure 5-(a)
gives the distributions observed in the period t = 20000 (corresponding to the last epoch of 20000
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Figure 4: Evolution of the market price: Convergence to the Cournot equilibrium price: Individual
learning without expectations and roulette wheel selection
Selection τ Convergence to CE Average p− value
1 1/20 0
10 3/20 0.04
25 12/20 0.19
RS 50 20/20 0.58
75 20/20 0.67
100 20/20 0.64
1 3/20 0.019
10 15/20 0.172
25 20/20 0.45
PTB 50 19/20 0.56
75 19/20 0.67
100 20/20 0.56
1 0/20 0
10 10/20 0.09
25 20/20 0.6
RWS 50 20/20 0.74
75 20/20 0.76
100 20/20 0.79
Table 1: Testing convergence to equilirium (20 runs with each configuration, Student’s t-test with
α = 5%)
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Figure 5: Distribution of quantities in all strategy populations. Observations from the last epochs of
20 runs for two different simulation lengths
a b c d n τ
p− value + + +
Table 2: Determinants of convergence to CE
periods simulations, with 200 generations for the GA) and Figure 5-(b), in t = 40000 (last epoch
of 40000 periods simulations, with 400 generations for the GA). The thick vertical line represents
qC , while the thin one corresponds to qW . The gray curves give estimated normal densities for each
distribution. These distributions show that our results are not subject to generic drift, and that we
do not observe a divergence from the CE in longer simulations. On the contrary, the distribution
is even more tightly centred on qC = 8.695 7 in the last observation set. The observed variance is
mainly due to the constant and strictly positive mutation rate; this is shown by the strong symmetry
of the distribution in this case.
These results show that the convergence to CE in the case of individual learning can be obtained
even under less specific assumptions about the Cournot game than in Vriend (2000). A simple
quadratic cost oligopoly game and an elementary, real value-based GA with only selection and low
mutation is sufficient to observe convergence in this case.
We have also analyzed in a more systematic way, factors that influence the convergence to the CE
with RWS. These factors are the demand and cost parameters (a, b, c, d), τ and the number of firms, n.
We have run 1300 simulations with randomly drawn values for these parameters (see Appendix A.3).
The results of Student’s t-test, comparing the mean of best production levels of the last period to
qC , indicate that in 97.3% of these simulations we cannot reject the null hypothesis of convergence
to CE
(
H0 : q¯ = qC
)
. This is quite a strong result given that 51.1% of the simulations correspond
to τ ≤ 25. We also determine the influence of these factors on the p − value for the convergence
test to CE. We remind you that the higher this value, the stronger the likelihood of convergence
(non-rejection of H0). Table 2 gives the factors that are significant at 5% and the direction of their
influence on p − value. At a very global level, and under the assumption of linearity, these results
show that factors favoring convergence are: a higher demand slope, a higher number of firms and a
higher epoch length. The result on τ is perfectly in line with preceding theoretical results. The result
on the number of firms can seem paradoxical (a higher number of firms is supposed to favor WE),
but one should not forget that a higher number of firms also corresponds here to a higher capacity of
exploration for the learning of the industry. A higher demand slope is favorable since it discriminates
more clearly between quantities from the point of view of their impact on the market price.
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5 Conclusion
The main objective of this article is to gain some general understanding of the convergence to
equilibrium in an oligopoly game with learning dynamics. We have established the properties, in
terms of evolutionary stability, of two types of potential equilibrium in this game: the Cournot
equilibrium (CE) and the Walrasian equilibrium (WE). The first part of the article shows that the
WE is quite robustly stable under general conditions when learning is based on imitation and random
experimenting (mutations). This result stems from the spite effect that appears when learning
possesses a social dimension (as in the case of imitation-based learning) and when dynamics are
based on selection, and hence on the relative performance of firms. With the spite effect, learning
through imitation and mutation diverts the attention of firms from their own profits and prevents
the emergence of dynamics based on best replies that could assure the evolutionary stability of the
CE. The WE becomes the only ESS equilibrium in this case. We must also consider the possibility of
multiple mutations, since they better correspond to the playing the field aspect of the Cournot game
(each firm meets in each period all other firms, and not a single, randomly drawn competitor). We
show in this case that dynamics and stability are very difficult to analyze under general conditions.
The second part of the article consequently focuses on a special setup that emerged in the literature for
analyzing learning dynamics: learning through Genetic Algorithms (GA). This focus is interesting
because this setup has yielded some puzzling results and controversies about the convergence to
the CE. We first study the general conditions under which the selection in the GA can promote
convergence to the CE. We show that when the GA represents social learning, the convergence can
only occur to the WE. In the case of individual learning, the convergence to the CE is only possible if
the interactions of the firms allow them to discover the decreasing relationship that prevails between
the market price and their quantities. We show that this is not possible with learning based on
hypothetical profits as considered by Arifovic in several articles and, more recently, in Arifovic and
Maschek (2006). Some direct confrontation of quantities is necessary to assure the discovery of the
impact of the quantities of firms on the market price, and to secure the convergence to the CE.
We show, in a computational setup close to Vriend (2000), but under quite general cost and GA
conditions, that the convergence to the CE arises when firms’ strategies have enough opportunity to
meet each other before the intervention of the GA. We also carry systematic Monte Carlo explorations
that shed light on the influence of different parameters on this convergence. Our results clarify the
results obtained in Vriend (2000) and Arifovic and Maschek (2006).
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A Appendix
A.1 Baseline oligopoly model of the experiments
We define a simple general oligopoly game with
P (qi, Q−i) = a− b(qi +Q−i), a, b > 0
Ci(qi) = F + cqi + dq2i
F, c ≥ 0, d ≤ 0.
For a n-firm oligopoly, the symmetrical equilibria are given as follows (with Q−i = (n− 1)q−i):
Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CE): qCi =
a− c
b+ 2d+ bn
Walrasian equilibrium (WE): qwi =
a− c
2d+ bn
> qCi
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In our simulations we use the following numerical specification for the oligopoly:
a = 256, b = 1, F = 0, c = 56, d = 1, n = 20.
CE: qCi = 200/23 = 8.695 7, p
C = 1888/23 = 82.087
WE: qWi = 100/11 = 9.090 9, p
W = 816/11 = 74.1818182
A.2 Specifications of the GA
In all simulations we use the same genetic algorithm (GA): a real value-based GA with 20 chromosomes. We
keep the number of generations constant over all simulations in order to let other parameters determine the
learning capacity of firms. In order to keep a GA structure as close as possible to our theoretical results,
we use a GA based only on selection (roulette wheel selection) and on mutations. We use a uniform rate of
exactly one mutation in each run of the GA. In the case of social learning, this mutation takes place in the
firm population. In the case of individual learning each mutation takes place in the strategy population of
every firm (hence we have as many mutations as the number of firms in each intervention of the GA).
The chromosomes of the first generation for each firm are randomly generated in the interval
[
(1− γ) qC , (1 + γ) qW ] ,
with γ = 1%. In the case of the learning without expectations (LWE, epoch-based learning), we have randomly
generated the profits corresponding to this first generation in the interval [0, 10].
Mutations introduce new strategies in the population and they are Gaussian, centered around the individual
strategy population average
qˆij = q¯i + σℵ (0, 1)
with initial profits drawn using the same structure for the LWE case
pˆiij = p¯ii + σℵ (0, 1) .
We use σ = 5% for the LWE case and σ = 1% in the learning with hypothetical profits case (LHP).
In the LWE the profits associated to the quantities are carried from period to period (and from epoch to
epoch) except when these quantities are used and the corresponding profits are updated or when they have
mutated and inherited a new random profit level.
We use the following scaled fitness function for our experiments:
Fij = exp
(
100 max
{
0,
piij
pi∗i
})
where pi∗i is the maximal profit in the individual population of strategies.
In the LHP case, only the best strategy is played in accordance with Arifovic and Maschek (2006).
In the learning without expectations case, three strategy selection mechanisms are tested:
• random selection (RS): a strategy is uniformly selected in the population to be played on the market;
• roulette wheel selection (RWS): the probability of selection of a strategy is proportional to its relative
fitness, fij = Fij/
∑
Fij ;
• play the best selection (PTB): the strategy with the highest relative fitness is played.
In this case, the populations of strategies are played without the intervention of the GA for a given number,
τ, of periods (the GArate in Vriend (2000)). We test the following cases: τ ∈ {1, 10, 25, 50, 75, 100}. The last
case corresponds to the assumption used by Vriend (2000).
We run 20 simulations with each configuration and the graphics of the Figure 4 give the evolution of the
market price in these 20 simulations. In Table 1, we give convergence results using Student’s t-test in each
configuration. We respectively test that the average of the firms’ best strategies in the last period is equal to
qC . For each configuration, we count cases for which the convergence can be accepted with α = 5%, over the
set of 20 simulations. We also give the average p− value in each configuration.
A.3 Monte Carlo simulations
We proceed with Monte Carlo simulations for a systematic analysis of determinants of convergence to equilib-
rium. We run 1, 300 simulations where the main parameters of the selection mechanism and of the Cournot
oligopoly are randomly drawn in given intervals:
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a ∈ [55, 300] , b ∈ [0.5, 2] , d ∈ [0, 5] , c ∈ [0, 50] , n ∈ {5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 20} , τ ∈ {10, 25, 50, 100} .
The GA is run with 300 generations. We otherwise use the baseline values of the parameters and the RWS
mechanism.
Results of the regression on p− value:
lm(formula = pvalueqc ~a + b + c + d + nbFirms + tau)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.72121 -0.21096 0.02297 0.21345 0.55502
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.871e-01 4.600e-02 6.241 6.44e-10 ***
a -4.785e-06 1.200e-04 -0.040 0.96819
b 5.573e-02 1.935e-02 2.880 0.00406 **
c 3.200e-04 5.855e-04 0.547 0.58479
d -2.598e-03 5.975e-03 -0.435 0.66382
nbFirms 1.527e-02 1.669e-03 9.148 < 2e-16 ***
tau 8.169e-04 2.481e-04 3.292 0.00103 **
---
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.2679 on 993 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.09496, Adjusted R-squared: 0.0895
F-statistic: 17.37 on 6 and 993 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
A.4 Oligopoly model of Vriend (2000)
Vriend (2000) adopts a very specific configuration for the oligopoly model:
P (Q) = −1× 10−97 − 1.5× 1095Q−39.99999997
Ci(qi) = −4.097× 10−94
Under these specifications, we have an oligopoly model very strictly tailored for N = 40 firms. The equilibria
are given by
CE: qCi = 942.4, p
C = 1.3333× 10−088
WE: qWi = 1593.5, p
W = 0
This is definitely not an ordinary oligopoly setup, and it cannot really be called well behaved. Under these very
specific conditions, the convergence to CE is not easily obtained, even with some fine-tuning of the GA. More
specifically, none of the selection mechanisms that we consider in the baseline model (RS, RWS or PTB) is able
to converge to CE under reasonable conditions. One needs the exact tournament selection of Vriend (2000)
to obtain a convergence such as in the Figure 6-(a) where the total quantity produced by the firms is plotted
across time and one can observe that the oligopoly remains in the neighborhood of CE instead of converging
to WE.
We also test the convergence under the alternative cost setup analyzed by Arifovic and Maschek (2006).
Following our general conclusions, convergence to CE must also be observed under individual learning with
this configuration. The cost function is the only difference with the baseline setup of Vriend (2000): Ci (qi) =
−2.060 × 10−84 + 1.0 × 10−90qi, C ′ > 0. Contrary to the conclusion of Arifovic and Maschek, we effectively
observe convergence to CE, as it is shown in Figure 6-(b).
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(a) - Baseline setup (b) - Alternative setup (C ′ > 0)
Figure 6: Convergence in Vriend(2000) (τ = 100)
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